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\ j 1/ (�' /'i' There have been several recent attempts to incorporate { \ '-' /''' uncertainty into international trade models. 1 All of these studies 
\ ; assume that markets exist only for currently available commodities 
and that no share trading is possible in order to provide for future 
consumption. Since without share trading there is no link between 
the behavior of the firm and the preferences of its stockholders, the 
reason that most of the standard theorems of trade theory under 
certainty fail to extend in these models is precisely due to this. 
Indeed, the general equilibrium trade models in nonstochastic environ­
ments assume (at least implicitly) that the profit of a firm is com­
pletely distributed among its stockholders. In this way, all wealth 
is distributed among consumers since nothing is taken out of the 
system by producers. It then follows immediately that producers in
private-ownership economies should act so as to maximize their 
profits since that object:ve is in the best interests of each of their 
stockholders, 
As we move to a general equilibrium model under uncertainty, 
Diamond [6] has shown that the proper objective of the firm becomes 
the maximization of its stock market value. If there is the equivalent
of a complete set of contingent claim markets in the economy, value­
maximizing decisions are agreed upon by all shareholders. In the 
absence of a sufficient number of markets, however, a difficulty 
frequently arises. Namely, stockholders may impute different sets 
of contingent claim prices and they will generally disagree about 
value-maximizing decisions. To circumvent this problem, it could 
be ass urned that firms maximize the expected utility of profits, 2 
2 
We would a:t'gue that this is a departure from the perfectly competitive 
inodel since it is an expression of "the divorce of ownership from 
3 manag\'lment. 11 
In this paper we will examine the effect of introducing price 
uncertainty into the Heckscher-Ohlin model while continuing to assume 
that we are dealing with private ownership economies in which con­
sumers may also be stockholders. These economies will in general 
not possess the equivalent of a complete set of contingent claim �arkets, 
but only as m.any securities as there are firms. We will continue to 
parallel the complete market model in which firms seek to maximize 
their current. stock market value by relying upon prices already implicit 
in the stock market. We have previously shown in [7] that there are no 
difficulties wi�h this rule in the presence of price uncertainty if there 
are as many different firms as prices, This condition ensures that 
all individuals will impute the same certainty-equivalent to each price 
and will unanimously agree upon value-maximizing decisions. We will 
show that with a single random price, the standard two-section two­
factor model satisfies this condition and we proceed to examine the 
traditional Heckscher-Ohlin model in this framework. Finally, we 
will show that by using the certainty-equivalent pric.es, the Rybczynski 
theorem, the Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) theorem, and the factor-price 
equalization theorem continue to hold. 
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II. THE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL 
We begin by using a state-preference version of a Fisherian 
model in which there is only a single commodit y available for consump­
t ion now, c0, or which may be invested in firms in order to provide for
consumption later if state of the world e occurs, ce, e 
= 1, • . .  's. 
Also assume that there are I individuals in this economy, each possess­
ing an endowment of the commodity, ci, an.cl a portfolio consisting of 
fractions, �. of each firm j. Each firm must choose the level of its
J 
decision variables, x., which determines the values of the .firms 
J 
. ,
V .(x), and the returns each firm offers next period if state of the 
J 
world e occurs, r.e(x.). Each individual then chooses a consumption­J J 
investment plan so as to maximize his expected utility, 
subject to the budget constraints 
i Ce 
< 
i 
co ?. 
N . . 
!: V.(x)(s� - s�)
j= l J J J 
N i !: r.e(x.)s.,j= 1 J J J 
e =1, . . .  ,s 
0, i 0, C
e > = e = 1, • • •  , s. 
(1) 
(2) 
Assuming sufficiently regular utility functions and letting short sales 
be unrestricted, the first-order conditions become · 
j :: ·l, • • •  ;-N ,, (3) 
where 
EU 
i = 0 
i i i aEU (c0, c8 ) 
i 
aco
4 
and 0 = l, . . . ,s, 
denote individual i1 s marginal utility for consumption now and for 
consumption later if state of the world 8 occurs, respectively. The 
conditions, (3), when taken together with the market clearing conditions
.I i� s. = 1,
i=l J 
j = l, • • .  ,N, 
determine an equilibrium in the capital market at the prices 
V 
j
' j = 1,,.,, N, for given decisions x = (x1,, . , ,  xN), We may .
rewrite (3) as
(4) 
h i • d 1 I w ere p 8 is in ividua i s contingent commodity price for consumption
in state of the world 8, i. e. 
i 
Pa =
i and 1T
8 is individual i1 s subjective probability that state of the world 8
may occur, 
In this paper, we wish to examine this model where the 
returns of the firm in each state are simply the profit of the firm in 
that state. Further, we will assume that the only uncertainty that 
is present is price uncertainty, Thus, each firm's return function 
is of the form· 
0 = 1, • • •  , s, (5) 
j = 1, • • , ,  N, 
5 
where w(8)  is a 1 x K vector of prices which occur in state 8 and 
�(x.) is a K x 1 vector of state-independent decision functions of firm j,
J 
We will further assume that no random price is perfectly correlated 
with the set of other random prices, To see that this assumption is 
not particularly restrictive, suppose that w 
K( 8) is perfectly correlated 
with { w1(8), • • •  ,wK-l(8)} . Then there exist constants a1, • • •  ,aK-l'
such that 
K-:1 
� a.w.(8),
j=l J J 
8 = 1, • • •  , S, 
and w (8) may be replaced by this sum in (5). 
K 
In this model, firms seek to maximize their value, which is 
given by substituting (5) into (4) as 
v. 
J 
Although individuals have imputed diffe.rent sets of contingent claim 
prices, if they agree upon each certainty-equivalent price given by 
k = l,, . .  ,K, (6) 
i -= 1, • • •  , I, 
the value of a firm is given by 
and value-maximizing decisions may be determined from 
j K Clfk(x.) � � __£_L 
k=l k axj 
0. 
6 
(7) 
The solution to (7) will be the same independently of which stockholder's 
contingent claim prices are used. 
We have seen in an earlier paper, [7], that (6) will hold if 
th . d d f' 4 d . 5 h' ere are as many 1n epen ent 1rms as ran om prices. In t 1s 
frame�ork, the certainty-equivalent price, �k' may be interpreted as
the value each individual would pay in the current period for an asset 
which returned the random price, wk(S), in the next period. We should 
also note at this point that if one of the prices is nonstochastic, then 
s. . 
all individuals in this model will also agree upon l; Pe, which is the S=l 
price they would pay for a risk-free asset which would yield one dollar 
in every state of the world next period.6 
III. THE HECKSCHER-OHLIN MODEL 
In this section, we will alter the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin 
model to <l;llow for one of the output prices to be random, As usual, 
we will begin by examining those factors which determine the relative 
commodity prices in an e<;:onomy. To do this, we shall need to 
maintain the usual assumptions that are made in this type of analysis, 
1. Given endowments of two factors, K and L (say, capital and labor) 
may be utilized to produce two commodities, y 1 and y 2• These goods 
are produced using linear homogeneous and concave production functions, 
F{K1, L1) and F 2(K2, L2), under conditions of perfect competition, full 
employment, inelastic factor supplies, and irreversible factor intensities. 
2. The price of the first commodity, x1, is random and given by p1 (S) 
and the price of the second commodity, p2, is nonstochastic. Decisions 
on the amount of K and L to be employed must be made prior to the 
realization of p1 ( S ). 
3. As discussed in the previous section, both producers wish to
maximize the value of their shares. We shall assume that after the 
realization of the state of the world, S, the profits of each firm are 
completely distributed among their shareholders. Letting rr l ( S) be 
the profits of the first industry if state of tQ.e world S occurs, then 
7 
where w is the wage rate and r the rental rate of capital. •The profits of 
the second industry, rr2, are nonrandom and given by 
Taking prices as given, firms in the first industry act to 
maximize their value 
Similarly, producers in the second industry wish to maximize 
v = 2 
Since there are two independent firms, it should be clear that this 
model satisfies the conditions given in the preceding section which 
ensure unanimity regarding 
let 
s . s . l . l 
� P9P1 (9) and � p9•9= 1 9= 1 
,..., p· = 
den ote the certainty-equivalent random price, and 
fV q = r 
s . l 
� Pe9=1 
8 
be the certainty equivalent risk-free price, since r is the riskless 
rental rate per unit of capital and thus must equal the risk-free rate 
of return. 
fV We will use as the numeraire the quantity qp2, which is· 
the value in the present period of an asset which returns Pz next period 
in every state of the world. This choice of nurrieraire has the effect 
of discounting all prices in the future period into current period terms. 
Thus, the 'values of firms in these two industries may be alternatively 
written as 
v
1 
"'* - w*L r*K p Fl(K l,L l) l 1 
= ""*' p t,l fl (kl) 
�' - w L1 * r K1 
and 
vz = Fz(Kz , Lz) - w*L r*K 2 2 
= Lz fz(kz) * r*K - w L2 2 
respectively, where the starred prices denote real prices (in current 
peri�d terms) and k. is the capital-labor rati o in the ith industry. l 
The two first- order conditions for value maximization by 
firms in the first industry are 
and 
p*f' (k ) - r* = 0 1 1 
p*[fl (kl) - kl f!(kl )] * - w = o. 
Of immediate interest here should be the fact that, just as in the 
7 certainty model, the value of the firm in equilibrium is zero. 
To see this, substitute ( 8 ) into ( 9 j, giving 
0 = p*f (k ) - k r'� - w* 1 1 1 
9 
(8) 
(9) 
Likewise, for firms in the second industry the value-maximizing 
c onditions are given by 
f2(kz) - * r = 0 (10) 
and 
fz(kz) - kz fz(kz) - w* 0. (11) 
Again we see that the values of firms in this industry are also zero 
in equilibrium, 
Since factor rewards will be identical with perfectly competitive 
markets, ( 8 ), (9; ), (10), and (11) yield the factor market equilibrium 
c onditions 
and 
'p*f' 1 £' 2 (12) 
(13) 
Finally, the m odel may be closed using the full employment assumption 
which requires that 
(14) 
FOOTNOTES 
1. Most notable are the contributions by Batra [l, 2), Brainard 
and Cooper [3), and TUrnovsky [13). 
2. As·in Batra [l,2].
3. This has previously been pointed out by Radner [12). 
4. In this framework, independence of firms requires that the 
state-distribution of returns offered by a firm cannot be written 
as some linear combination of returns of all other firms. 
5. To see this, substitute (5) into the first-order conditions, (4), 
which gives 
V.(x) 
J 
j = l, . .. ,N 
0=1, ... ,s. 
If there are K independent firms, then this provides us with a si
s i K equations in K unknowns, I: p8wk(8). Since each individual i 8=1' 
confronted with the sam.e set of equations, they must necessaril· 
agree upon each certainty-equivalent random price, i. e. 
k = l, ... ,K 
i = l, ... ,I . 
6. ·At this point, it should be noted that this result could al�o have 
been derived by using the 1unanimity11 framework of Ekern [5), 
Ekern and Wilson [6 ], Leland [8, 9], and Radner [11 ]. This waE 
previously pointed out in [7). 
7. 
15 
This result may at first seem paradoxical but it is the exact 
analogy of the certainty model in which firms possessing linear 
homogeneous production functions earn zero profits in equilibrium. 
A stronger version of this is proved in [7), where we show that, 
independent Of the functional form chosen, as long as a firm's 
return function is linear homogeneous, the value of that firm 
in equilibrium must be zero. 
8. See, for instance, the proof given by McKenzie [l OJ. 
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